WHEN Russian and Ukrainian delegations meeting in Turkey on March 29 reached an initial understanding regarding a list of countries that could serve as security guarantors for Kiev should an agreement be struck, Israel appeared on the list.

The other countries included the US, Britain, China, Russia, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy and Poland.

One may explain Israel’s political significance to the Russian-Ukrainian talks based on Tel Aviv’s strong ties with Kiev, as opposed to Russia’s trust in Israel. This is insufficient to rationalise how Israel has managed to acquire relevance in an international conflict, arguably the most serious since WWII.

Immediately following the start of the war, Israeli officials began to circumnavigate the globe, shuttling between many countries that are directly or even nominally involved in the conflict. Israeli President Isaac Herzog flew to Istanbul to meet with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The outcome of this meeting could usher in “a turning point in relations between Turkey and Israel,” Erdogan said.

Though “Israel is proceeding cautiously with Turkey,” Lavan Karkov wrote in the Jerusalem Post, Herzog hopes that “his meeting with ... Erdogan is starting a positive process toward improved relations.”

The improved relations are not concerned with the fate of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation and siege, but with a gas pipeline connecting Israel’s Leviathan offshore gas field in the eastern Mediterranean to southern Europe via Turkey.

This project will improve Israel’s geopolitical status in the Middle East and Europe. The political leverage of being a primary gas supplier to Europe would allow Israel even stronger influence over the continent and will certainly tone down any future criticism of Tel Aviv by Ankara.

That was only one of many such Israeli overtures. Tel Aviv’s diplomatic flurry included a top-level meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, and a succession of visits by top European, US, Arab and other officials to Israel. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken landed in Israel on March 26 and was expected to put some pressure on Israel to join the US-led Western sanctions on Russia.

Little of that has transpired. The greatest rebuke came from Under-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, when, on March 11, she called on Israel not to become “the last haven for dirty money that’s fuelling Putin’s wars.”

For years, Israel had hoped to free itself from its disproportionate reliance on Washington. This dependency took on many forms: financial and military assistance, political backing, diplomatic cover and more. According to Chuck Freilich, writing in Newsweek, “by the end of the 10-year military-aid package... agreed (between Washington and Tel Aviv) for 2019-28, the total figure (of US aid to Israel) will be nearly $170bn.”

Many Palestinians and others believe that, if the US ceases to support Israel, the latter would simply collapse.

However, this might not be the case, at least not in theory. Writing in March 2021 in the New York Times, Max Fisher estimated that US aid to Israel in 1981 “was equivalent to almost 10 per cent of Israel’s economy,” while in 2020, the nearly $4 billion of US aid was “closer to 1 per cent.”

Still, this 1 percent is vital for Israel, as much of the funds are funnelled to the Israeli military which, in turn, converts them to weapons that are routinely used against Palestinians and other Arab countries.

Israeli military technology of today is far more developed than it was 40 years ago. Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) place Israel as the world’s eighth-largest military exporter between 2016-2020, with an estimated export value of $8.3 billion in 2020 alone. These numbers continue to grow as Israeli military hardware is increasingly incorporated into many security apparatuses across the world, including the US, the EU and also in the global South.

Much of this discussion is rooted in a document from 1996, entitled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm. The document was authored by Richard Perle, former US Assistant Secretary of Defence, jointly with top leaders in the neoconservative movement in Washington.

The target audience of that research was none other than Benjamin Netanyahu, who was then the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister. Aside from the document’s detailed instructions on how Israel can use some of its Arab neighbours, in addition to Turkey, to weaken and “roll back” hostile governments, it also made significant references to future relations Tel Aviv should aspire to develop with Washington.

Perle urged Israel to “make a clean break from the past and establish a new vision for the US-Israeli partnership based on self-reliance, maturity and mutuality — not one focused narrowly on territorial disputes.”

This new, self-reliant Israel “does not need US troops in any capacity to defend it.”

Ultimately, such self-reliance “will grant Israel greater freedom of action and remove a significant lever of pressure used against it in the past.”

An example is Israel’s relations with China. In 2013, Washington was outraged when Israel sold secret missile and electro-optic US technology to China. Quickly, Tel Aviv was forced to retreat.

The controversy subsided when the head of defence experts at the Israeli Defence Ministry was removed. Eight years on, despite US protests and demands that Israel must not allow China to operate the Israeli Haifa port due to Washington’s security concerns, the port was officially initiated in September 2021.

Israel’s regional and international strategy seems to be advancing in multiple directions, some of them directly opposing those of Washington. Yet, thanks to continued Israeli influence in the US Congress, Washington does little to hold Israel accountable.

Meanwhile, now that Israel is fully aware that the US has changed its political attitude in the Middle East and is moving in the direction of the Pacific region and eastern Europe, Tel Aviv’s “clean break” strategy is moving faster than ever before.

However, this comes with risks. Though Israel is stronger now, its neighbours are also getting stronger. Hence, it is critical that Palestinians understand that Israel’s survival is no longer linked to the US, at least not as intrinsically as in the past.

Therefore, the fight against Israeli occupation and apartheid can no longer be disproportionately focused on breaking up the “special relationship” that united Tel Aviv and Washington for over 50 years.

Israel’s “independence” from the US entails risks and opportunities that must be considered in the Palestinian struggle for freedom and justice.

Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle — www.ramzybaroud.net.