THE short answer is — not in the way that many socialists who have yet to make their own revolution in the metropolitan heartlands of capitalism might imagine “their” socialism to be.  

However, as Marx declared, people make their own history but not in circumstances of their choosing — and this is as true of China as anywhere else.  

Many of those on the far left who regard the former Soviet Union as “state capitalist” put the People’s Republic of China in the same boat.  

Interestingly, some on the right are equally keen to claim China’s extraordinary economic and social advances for capitalism. So: is China’s economy socialist? Has it ever been? 

Following the 1949 revolution, under the first Five Year Plan (1953-57) most industry and commerce in the cities and large towns was nationalised and in what was largely a rural, semi-feudal society, landowners were expropriated and agricultural and handicraft production taken over by village communes.  

A second Five Year Plan — the Great Leap Forward (1958-62) — was a failure. An attempt to accelerate the transition from an agrarian economy into a communist society through agricultural collectivisation and rapid industrialisation, it delivered only modest increases in production and famine hit some areas.

Subsequently however, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) led a recovery until 1966 when Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution.

This aimed to protect Chinese communism by purging perceived capitalist and traditional remnants from the party and society, and to reimpose Mao Zedong Thought as the dominant ideology. Led by the Red Guards and (later) the Gang of Four, the result was turmoil and chaos until Mao’s death 10 years later.

The CPC’s Reform and Opening Up strategy of 1978 led by Deng Xiaoping invited non-mainland Chinese and foreign capital to establish enterprises in special economic zones.  

These are now major sources of advanced technology, investment and employment and a significant part of China’s domestic economy.  

The CPC has chosen to engage with global capitalism, as far as possible on the CPC’s own terms, permitting the controlled growth of private economic ownership and markets and participation in international trade and investment.  

Internally, restructuring and consolidation reforms from 1993 have concentrated state ownership in large enterprises and retained monopoly control in key sectors such as energy, transport, communications, armaments and finance. 

The current plan builds on the first centenary goal to achieve a “moderately prosperous society,” although for the first time, given the Covid pandemic and recession in the capitalist world, no target is given for growth or the eradication of absolute rural poverty.  

Transnational corporations from mainland China have meanwhile made a dramatic entry onto the world stage. According to the Fortune Global 500 list, 98 of the world’s biggest 500 TNCs in 2014 were Chinese (only the US has more). Of these, three-quarters were state-owned, including the top 12. 

The CPC seeks to develop a “socialist market economy” in which strategic public ownership and Communist Party governance are decisive. 

According to the CPC, “China is currently in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come. This is a stage of history that cannot be bypassed as China, which used to be economically and culturally lagging, makes progress in socialist modernisation; it will take over a century.”  

The second centenary goal is to “build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049; this after “basically realising socialist modernisation” by 2035.  

The US broadly agrees and US officials point to the specific features of China’s economy which define it as socialist rather than capitalist: centralised planning, dominant and statutory state ownership in key sectors (eg banking, energy, transport, telecommunications, health, education); some form of social ownership of almost all land; no internal free market in labour; the supremacy in law of the CPC and the role of CP organisation in private sector workplaces.  

That perception is reinforced by the recent 20th CPC congress which committed China to moving to “full-process democracy” (a consultative democracy rather than the representative democracy beloved by capitalism) and (in contrast to the bellicose rhetoric of Western leaders) the promotion of a “human community with a shared future” as an alternative to the current US-dominated world economy.  

Constitutional amendments included commitment to a “basic socialist economic system, with public ownership as the mainstay and diverse forms of ownership developing together” and one aimed at raising the share of labour as opposed to profit in GDP, stating that “distribution according to work is the mainstay while multiple forms of distribution exist alongside it.”  

Together with a commitment to reducing carbon emissions, China leads the world in areas such as renewable energy and reforestation.  

China’s socialist trajectory is not without hazards and contradictions. After 1949, Chinese society faced the conflict between its low-level, largely pre-capitalist forces of production and the Communist Party’s aspirations for a society based on post-capitalist relations of production. 

The CPC had to proceed by trial, error and innovation. Today, it identifies the principal contradiction in Chinese society as that between “the ever-growing needs of the people for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development.”  

Moreover, as Chinese society’s productive forces continue to grow rapidly and production relations are transformed, a new set of contradictions arises: between new Chinese capitalists and a new urban and industrial working class; between markets and centralised planning; and between Communist Party rule and narrow, “economistic” perceptions of class interest within the capitalist and working classes. 

Naturally, these contradictions are reflected — in local politics, in the Chinese media and within the CPC itself. Allowing the growth of a capitalist class is a strategy not without risk.

Regarding democracy, Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party, is also president of the People’s Republic and head of its armed forces.  

This is a significant concentration of power in one individual and in 2018, term limits for the presidency (introduced shortly after the death of Mao Zedong to encourage collective leadership) were abolished.  

Potential advantages in terms of continuity (Xi is generally popular in China and his anti-corruption campaigns have included restrictions on and divestment of business assets of members of his own family) are accompanied by the dangers of a personality cult and risks of a power vacuum when Xi (age 69) finally goes.  

Another issue concerns the poor representation of women in the higher levels of government; women comprised a small minority of delegates to the recent CPC congress and (for the first time in 25 years) there are none on the seven member standing committee of the politburo.  

The issues raised here need to be considered in the context of China’s history and its emergence as a world power, declaredly advancing towards socialism in the face of hostility from the metropolitan heartlands of capital and despite military encirclement by the US and (via the Aukus pact) Australia and Britain.

So — is China socialist? Let’s rephrase the question: is China providing a better life for its people and is it progressing towards socialism? The answer to the first part of the question has to be a categorical Yes. As to the second: socialism is the objective of China’s government but its realisation will depend on China’s people. Meantime, and in very different circumstances, we have yet to secure our own path to socialism.  

Next Monday, November 28, the Marx Memorial Library is hosting an on-site and online seminar: On the Evolving Significance of the Chinese Revolution with Andrew Murray and China specialist Ken Hammond, exploring how China is changing in a changing world. On Wednesday November 30 John Bellamy Foster will deliver the annual Engels Memorial Lecture entitled Engels and the Second Foundation of Marxism. On Wednesday November 23 is the third and final session of the Morning Star’s Science and Society team’s series, Science for the Future, focusing on science as work. For details of all these events visit www.marx-memorial-library.org.uk. Don’t miss them! All kick off at 7pm.