WE ARE currently the US junior partner in two bloody, foolish military engagements and the questions keep coming. 

When did the Prime Minister volunteer us for war? Why? On what terms?

I don’t have the answer to those questions on Iraq or Afghanistan, but some papers I received under Freedom of Information address the same issues for an older British-backed US military adventure. 

In 1986 former US president Ronald Reagan bombed Libya from British bases with Margaret Thatcher’s backing.

The documents show that the US didn’t really discuss the bombing, that the British government worried about losing control, that it rushed to support the US bombing anyway and that it was shocked how unpopular the bombing was. 

Reagan launched his F111 jets from RAF bases in Suffolk and Oxfordshire to bomb Libya on April 15 1986.

The air strike, which killed 60 Libyans, was in retaliation for alleged Libyan involvement in a terrorist bombing on a Berlin nightclub which killed two US soldiers. In fairness to Reagan, it is likely Libyan secret services were involved in the nightclub bombing. 

Thatcher, who was heavily criticised for the bombing raid, defensively told Parliament that no second wave of bombing was planned and no planes would be sent to Libya without Reagan making “a new approach to the UK under the joint consultation arrangements.”

But the papers I received show there was no consultation over the original bombing. US use of British airbases is governed by the 1952 Churchill-Truman communique.

After World War II, the US wanted a free hand to launch planes from British bases. Winston Churchill pushed back and, with difficulty, negotiated an agreement that said: “The use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's government and the United States government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.”

But the supposedly Churchillian Thatcher did not use Winston’s deal.

A “top secret” draft press release written by  a senior official in the Defence Department on April 11 1986 makes clear that the raid was not a “joint decision” in terms of the 1952 communique.

It reads: “The Prime Minister agreed that the US should, if necessary, use their forces in the United Kingdom, but there was no ‘joint decision’ on the action in Libya, which is a national action by the United States.”

In the accompanying letter, the official makes clear the Ministry of Defence worried that, by allowing the US to fly its planes without a joint decision, Britain weakened control of its territory.  

He writes: “The argumentation about the decision on the use of US bases in this country raises two issues, which will require very careful consideration.”

These are “the need to avoid anything which could set a precedent affecting our ability in the future to control US use of assets in this country” and “our possible concern on this occasion to avoid stating publicly that the US actions had been a matter of ‘joint decision’ in the terms of the 1952 Churchill-Truman agreement.”

The papers also suggest that the US did not give Thatcher a precise date for the bombing and at most gave five days notice.

The British government was prepared for the air attack to begin immediately after Thatcher spoke to US ambassador general Vernon Walters.

On April 11, Thatcher’s adviser Charles Powell called for briefings for the visit of US ambassador Walters on April 12. The actual briefings were kept secret, but some “briefing material on a contingency basis for use over the weekend” was released.

This contingency material is a justification for the bombing raid. Remarkably the justification for the bombing was sent out even though it had “not yet been seen by ministers.”

The document is marked “secret” and titled: “Libya: contingency press line.” It includes lines on a justification for the bombing, the legality of US action and backing the US action as a “legitimate exercise of the right of self defence.”

They got their lines on regret ready early too. Even though the bombing raid had not actually take place, the Foreign Office spinners were already feeling sad about the civilians the US was about to blow up.

The press officers were told to say they “regret civilian casualties [and that] US made every effort to minimise these, [that they were] satisfied that US action was appropriate in the circumstances.”

The press briefings say that there was “permission to use US bases in this case” and “we were approached in advance by the US government about their wish to use USAF aircraft from bases in this county.”

However, as the documents show, the advance notice was less than a week and, while there was “permission” for the bombing, there was no “joint decision.”

The released papers also show the government was disturbed by the public response. There was, according to a May 16 note from the “Libya Unit” a “flood of letters from the public following the Libyan bombing.” There were so many that the Foreign Office suggested letters were “an aspect which must be taken into account in future crises management,” including a suggestion for setting aside office space to house all the angry letters.

“Of the estimated 15,000 letters, most came from the UK but some thousands were also received from overseas, mostly the US. The latter were 100 per cent supportive while the great majority of the British letters were hostile.”

Twelve thousand, five hundred letters got a “standard” departmental reply, 100 were lucky enough to get a “non standard” reply and 1,500 got “no reply” because they were “abusive, illegible”

The government was taken aback enough to run its own private polling. Most of the results have been redacted — our own opinions are a state secret apparently — but they do admit that, “although 50 per cent still thought that the US raid on Libya was wrong, 40 per cent now thought it was right.”

Looking on the bright side, the Foreign Office thought this minority support was at least “a higher proportion in favour than the UK’s media coverage would suggest.”