SUDDENLY, Yoav Gallant, Israel’s notorious minister of defence, disappeared into obscurity. The man who served in his country’s military for about 35 years, in politics for nearly 10, and oversaw major wars, including the ongoing genocide in Gaza, quickly retreated from headlines and political significance.

In his resignation letter, Gallant accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who fired him on November 5, along with his replacement, Israel Katz, of endangering the country’s security. However, he kept his criticism largely focused on the issue of military conscription for Israel’s ultra-Orthodox community.

Gallant’s refusal to offer an exemption to Israel’s Haredim had always been a source of tension between him and his domineering boss. Yet, the political weight of that issue seems to have been greatly inflated by all parties, each with a political purpose in mind.

Gallant wanted to signal to the more secular and nationalistic factions within the Likud party — the largest in Netanyahu’s ruling coalition — that he advocated a fairer and more equitable Israel. Netanyahu, who heads the Likud, wanted to appeal to the more religious segments of the party and to his deeply religious coalition partners.

Considering Israel’s shift towards the extreme religious right, it was only natural for Netanyahu to ultimately win this round. Gallant, who as of January 1 had also resigned from the Israeli Knesset, made his resignation letter largely about the Likud, and less about Israel itself.

“My path is the Likud path, and I believe in its principles, trust its members and voters,” he said, linking his first vote for the party to a partnership in “Menachem Begin’s revolution,” while priding himself on remaining “loyal to the movement’s national and ideological path.”
 
Gallant’s sentiment could be understood in two ways: either as a way to seal his legacy before quitting politics altogether, or, more likely, as the charting of a new political discourse that would allow him to compete for the leadership of Likud — and perhaps even for the premiership.

Netanyahu understands this well and seems to have concluded that his only path to political survival is the continuation of the Gaza war and the expansion of the conflict to engage multiple parties. It is this expanded war that has allowed him to recover his pre-war approval ratings and keep his coalition partners satisfied.

The Israeli prime minister’s strategy over the last 15 months of genocidal war has been consistent with his political legacy: achieving power and holding onto it. But the events that followed October 7 2023, have made his chances of political survival much slimmer.

In the past, Netanyahu mastered the art of survival by exploiting his rivals’ weaknesses, using his power to emotionally manipulate the Israeli public with a mix of nationalistic, religious and personal discourse. This narrative often portrays Netanyahu and his family as victims of numerous enemies who have ceaselessly plotted his downfall, despite all the good he has done for the country.

“Netanyahu’s victim mentality” has long been a topic in Israeli media, even years before the war. It is a strategy he has used to defend himself in court against accusations of corruption, and it continues to serve him even during the war. Even the arrest warrants against him and his sacked defence minister, Gallant, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on November 21, have been used to feed the narrative that Netanyahu is being punished for simply loving Israel too much.

However, when the war ends, merely playing the victim card will no longer suffice. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to explain what transpired beginning on October 7: the collapse of the security apparatus, the failure of the military, the lack of strategy, the severely weakened economy, the splintering of the nation, the killing of hostages and much more.

Even Netanyahu, the master politician, will struggle to keep the public on his side or his angry coalition partners in line. In fact, the right-wing coalition is already on the verge of collapse. The joining of Gideon Sa’ar and his New Hope Party on September 29 may have breathed some life into it, but the constant threats from Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir make the government unstable, at best.

The strength of the government was tested on December 31, when a decisive vote on the budget law sparked a public fight between Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, almost leading to the latter’s removal.

Yet the government remains intact simply because the war remains ongoing. The war, and the expanded conflict, have allowed Netanyahu’s ministers to push their extremist agendas without question, which ultimately allows Netanyahu to stay at the helm a bit longer.

But none of this is likely to change the post-war scenario: where the coalition is likely to falter, Likud may enter its own civil war, and Israeli society will likely erupt in mass protests.

It is then that coalition partners will become enemies, and the likes of Gallant may return, offering themselves as saviours. What will Netanyahu do then?

Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the editor of The Palestine Chronicle (www.palestinechronicle.com). He is the author of six books. His latest book, co-edited with Ilan Pappe, is Our Vision for Liberation: Engaged Palestinian Leaders and Intellectuals Speak Out.