Hezbollah: Mobilisation and Power
Aurelie Daher, Hurst, £18.99
ORIGINALLY published in 2014 in French, translated into English in 2019 and then reissued in a paperback this year, Aurelie Daher’s book is a meticulous and fascinating academic account of the development of Lebanon’s Party of God.
With current developments in west Asia it can hardly be more relevant. The Israeli campaign to wipe out Palestine continues apace, Tel Aviv presses ahead with provocations on both Iran and Hezbollah, which, if answered, would drag the United States into entering the conflict.
It would be very difficult to understand what this might lead to. The US has an established pattern of wrecking countries and then withdrawing as it remains unable to achieve political solutions by blowing things up. Both Israel and the US have powerful military capabilities, hard-line governments, and nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah has significantly strengthened since 2014, with an extensive missile arsenal that could overwhelm the Iron Dome. Daher’s book offers insights into how Hezbollah might navigate this situation, exploring its origins, growth, successes and strategies.
Hezbollah is uniquely Lebanese, and Daher opens her work with a series of maps of the state that became Lebanon after the Ottoman empire and Sykes-Picot. Sunnis live here, Shias live there, over here are Maronite Christians, there Orthodox Greek Christians, and there Catholic Greek Christians. And down here are the Druze. Between 18 different recognised sects, government could be tricky.
The Country of Cedars thus developed a system of “confessionalism” where government seats would be allocated first on the basis of the sects, with “proportional” shares for each community, each of which grew in different ways. Leaders sought clientelism and looked after their own; the Shia were regarded as Persian interlopers, and demeaned as shoe-shiners.
To the east was Syria, and south was Israel, in the midst of its wars with Palestinians, some of whom were based in Lebanon. It would be fair to say Lebanese politics was complicated.
On the eve of the Israeli invasion of 1982 militant Shi’ism was split into numerous factions, with a multitude of alliances and animosities. The invasion gelled some of the factions into a single organisation who sought support from the relatively new revolutionary regime in Iran.
Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini approved the plan and advised the new organisation: “What matters is to work,” warning them the struggle would be arduous: they should not “expect to reap the fruits of their action in their lifetimes.” But the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon was born.
Ultimately Hezbollah drove the invaders from Lebanon in 2006, bringing much esteem to the Shia community, and, as geopolitics pundits phrase it, establishing deterrence against Israel. Daher details much of the minutiae. Israeli tactics such as bombing UN facilities, civilians, infrastructure, farms, funerals, refugees and children are sadly nothing new. But what is more interesting are the insights into how Hezbollah operated and achieved what it did despite the unfavourable circumstances.
Ideologically, Hezbollah has its roots is Shia Islam, given impetus by the diminished national and social status of Shia Muslims in Lebanon and radicalised by Israeli invasion. Initially set up by religious leaders who saw Islam as their first and foremost inspiration, its ruling organs remain dominated by clerics.
While it relies on some conservative Islamic views its goals are thoroughly national and secular. Other authors have attributed or interpreted anti-semitic statements to various Hezbollah officials over a long period of time. Daher, on the other hand, has nothing to say about anti-semitism in Hezbollah at all. It is, however, clear that it is very much against zionism.
Early Hezbollah wanted to follow the Iranian example and establish an Islamic republic. But conditions in Lebanon are not analogous to Iran, and this was quietly dropped for a more inclusive approach to all communities. Ultimately, though, shaking off the Israeli occupation was its core aim: “we wanted a Resistance”, said Hassan Nasrallah, “we did not come to form a political party.”
And so Hezbollah is not a conventional political party. Others have called it a state within a state, as it undertakes roles the Lebanese state cannot or will not fulfil. This includes military operations, but it also includes social development programmes which include hospitals, schools, agricultural technical centres, as well as an entire body dedicated to reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure. A social association pays stipends to the families of warriors who have died in battle.
Daher’s investigation argues that Hezbollah organisationally owes more to communist and socialist models than Islam. In effect Hezbollah has geographically bounded branches, districts and regions. Its seven-member consultative council is elected every three years by a general congress.
There are political, parliamentary action, judicial and military councils. The general congress is supreme and criticises or endorses the consultative council’s policy and work. Central units with responsibility by subject matter have managers who report to, and constitute, the executive council.
Hezbollah membership is, however, only open to men because “women are not obligated to take part in armed combat.” There is considerable training on political affairs. Hezbollah members, according to Daher, are regarded for their discipline and adherence to ethics including non-sectarianism.
Punishment for communities collaborating with Israel or against civilians is prohibited. During military operations anecdotes circulated comparing Hezbollah’s behaviour to others operating in the neighbourhood: “How do you know if its [rival Shia movement] AMAL or Hezb that entered an apartment?... If the apartment is ransacked, the furniture trashed or stolen, the walls scorched, then it was AMAL. If everything is in place and there are two bearded guys, one of them vacuuming and the other dusting, and there’s a note on the dining room table that reads “Sorry for the inconvenience,” it’s the Hezb!”
Hezbollah’s secretary-general since 1992, Nasrallah, has significantly shaped its public image. The killing of his 18-year-old son Hadi in 1997 during a military operation against an Israeli patrol underscored the stoicism, dignity and personal commitment of Nasrallah and his family to the resistance.
Israel captured Hadi’s body, but his return to Lebanon was not prioritised above other casualties. When the bodies were returned, Nasrallah attended to each coffin equally. This bolstered his reputation among the Lebanese public, elevating him to an almost messianic status following the liberation of south Lebanon in 2000.
Hezbollah is routinely described in the West with a single word: “Islamist,” with all its negative associations. However, Daher presents it as primarily driven by resistance to colonialism and sectarianism, aiming for liberation from Israeli occupation and aggression.
It is wound through with pragmatism and patience. Islam definitely plays a role, and Shia Islam in particular, but from this reading it provides spiritual strength and frames meaning in the universe. Ultimately its goals are not religious, but material and concrete political gains.
This book would have benefited from updating to the present day, not just because of the current escalation by Israel towards a new war, but because it necessarily omits the mass protests that erupted in 2019-20 calling for an end to the sectarian political system and the introduction of a more democratic one — protests in which the Lebanese Communist Party played a leading role, but to which Hezbollah was seen as antagonistic because of its position within Lebanon’s existing power structures.
But even up to 2013, Hezbollah is worth studying. How Hezbollah, along with other resistance organisations, is considering its present circumstances is of considerable importance. Whatever it does, or does not do, it will impact Israeli and US decision-making in the coming months.