WHAT does history tell us about where we are today, well into the first half of the 21st century? It surely tells us that capitalism remains the greatest obstacle to solving the manifold injustices, irrationalities and existential threats that face humanity.

History also teaches us that the false answers of nationalism, racialism and social exclusion remain leading obstacles to overcoming capitalism and the class divide at the centre of capitalist social relations.

Division — the separation of potential allies in the struggle against capitalism — remains a deep infection immobilising those seeking social justice for all, a lesson the advocates of both casually chosen and deeply personal identities seem to have missed.

We are even further removed from defeating capitalism when we construct unlimited identity barriers to unity, when who we are as an individual comes before who we are as a class.

History’s lessons are easily lost to hasty generalisations and wishful thinking. The “victory” of the US over the USSR in 1991 was thought to usher in the end of history and, in the mind of celebrated intellectual, Francis Fukuyama, the global ascension of US values and US rule over the global order.

Within a decade, this conclusion met determined resistance on many fronts, as the US attempted to enforce its dominance, only to be challenged on all counts by independent rising powers, insurgencies, and defiant forces in Asia, the Middle East, and South America. The two-decade-long war in Afghanistan is but one dramatic example of that stubborn resistance to US power.

Unfortunately, popular resistance in the capitalist powers of Europe and North America took a different turn after 1991. A “third way” centre left, buoyed by the setback to communism, abandoned class politics for “a rising tide lifts all boats” economic policy, as well as cultural politics, the chosen field of battle favoured by the political right.

This “respectable” left — respectable to power and wealth — paid an electoral price over the following decades with the erosion of working-class votes. Today, the Euroamerican centre left, along with its centre-right counterpart, struggle weakly to dominate politics, as they have since World War II.

The multifaceted crises of capitalism — unemployment, slack economic growth, inflation, recession, political illegitimacy, inequality, eviscerated social services, rotting infrastructure and environmental degradation — have all struck at one time or another since capitalism’s “triumph” in 1991.

The lowering of mass expectations and the rising of mass deprivation have presented the radical left with the objective opportunity for change only imagined in earlier generations.

But the radical left was not ready for the challenge, convinced after 1991 that socialism, as we came to know it, was either impossible or too far off in the distant future to be our project.

The self-annihilation and mutation of Europe’s two largest communist parties only added to the pessimism. It was a time not unlike the years after the failed 1905 Russian revolution, as described by Lenin:

“The years of reaction (1907-10). Tsarism was victorious. All the revolutionary and opposition parties were smashed. Depression, demoralisation, splits, discord, defection and pornography took the place of politics. There was an ever greater drift towards philosophical idealism; mysticism became the garb of counter-revolutionary sentiments. At the same time, however, it was this great defeat that taught the revolutionary parties and the revolutionary class a real and very useful lesson, a lesson in historical dialectics, a lesson in an understanding of the political struggle, and in the art and science of waging that struggle. It is at moments of need that one learns who one’s friends are. Defeated armies learn their lesson.” — VI Lenin, Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.

Except the radical left largely drew no useful lessons from the 1991 setback, beyond the abandonment of the socialist project. When jobs migrated in huge numbers to low-wage countries, the left blamed “globalisation,” a process commonly and frequently encountered in the capitalist accumulation process.

It is far easier, but far less effective, to fight a phase — a phase soon to be transcended by a resurgent economic nationalism — for society’s ills than to attack its parent: capitalism. It is as though people believed that they could actually turn back the clock to some imagined, more benign era of capitalism.

Others in the diluted socialist movement designated the enemy as another phase of capitalism: “neoliberalism,” a set of ruling class policies designed to escape the 1970s collapse of the post-war Keynesian, demand-side paradigm.

During that lost decade, stagflation and aggressive foreign competition brought the class-collaboration model into disrepute, with the monopoly corporations turning viciously on their counterpart, the class-collaborationist labour leadership; decades of capitalist offensive followed, with a rout of working people’s liberal and “progressive” former allies; many past gains were reversed.

After 1991 and with far too many having abandoned the socialist project, the broad left chose not to attack the cancer of capitalism, instead, choosing to try to dull the painful symptom of neoliberalism.

The drift to “philosophical idealism” described by Lenin was everywhere in the wake of the fall of the USSR. Academics diminished Lenin’s theory of imperialism, with wild fantasies of the decline of the nation-state (a fantasy embarrassed by the aggressive global reach of the US empire, the pre-eminent, most powerful nation-state of all time).

Other thinkers saw transnational capitalist corporations overshadowing and superseding the nation-state, as though the nation-state was not intimately fused with monopoly capital.

This drift from Lenin’s historical-materialist analysis reached its ludicrous peak with the infamous tract of Hardt and Negri, Empire, positing that history was now grounded in a mysterious, totalising force that they called “empire,” an obscure, ineffable entity rivalling Hegel’s “Absolute.”

Some on the international left saw a possible socialist revival in the righteous rejection of US domination by social movements in Latin America, the so-called “pink tide.” Elections brought to power several promising charismatic leaders who openly and strongly defied the long-imposed dictates of US imperialism.

Most notably, Hugo Chavez mocked and scorned the US government’s arrogance, establishing an independent foreign policy and embarking upon a generous and humane welfare state based on Venezuela’s then-ample resource revenue.

Other leaders in Central and South America were inspired to join this anti-US imperialist, social democratic front, with the goal of Bolivarian independence from neocolonialism (a sovereignty project) as their most common feature.

Because of “socialist” rhetoric, many on the left elevated these multi-class, reformist movements to the status of “21st century socialism.” In fairness, some leaders truly aspired and envisioned socialism, though they lacked a programme, a revolutionary party, and the necessary understanding.

Twenty-first-century socialism, without an existential confrontation with capitalism, has proven to be an elusive goal, especially with a US-supported domestic bourgeoisie still holding vast economic power.

The social democratic dream of taming while partnering with capitalism, has nowhere sustained the support of the working classes. With a hostile behemoth on its doorstep, it is not succeeding in Latin America, either.

The latest notion distracting the left from socialism is the doctrine that global multipolarity  — removing the unipolar US from the pinnacle of the imperialist heap — will somehow produce a more just world and even move us closer to socialism.

While capitalists in many countries would welcome levelling the economic playing field and freeing markets for others to exploit, a multipolar world offers no obvious benefit to working people.

Without question, the iron grip that US capitalists have had on international economic institutions and the promiscuous use of US sanctions and tariffs has incensed US rivals and weakened US hegemony. But their success in blunting US power holds little consequence for exploited workers in Asia, Central and South America or Africa, who continue to be exploited.

Like the period after the 1905 Russian revolution described by Lenin, the period after the exit of the USSR has been difficult for the international left. After dalliances with bizarre, “novel,” and foolish answers to what many perceive as the failure of socialism, the left has offered a beleaguered working class few victories.

In the last 33 years, theorists have contrived new enemies: neoliberal capitalism, disaster capitalism, racial capitalism, crony capitalism, hyper-capitalism, coronavirus capitalism, unipolar capitalism and a host of other hyphenated capitalisms.

What all of these theories share is a fatal hesitation to call out the capitalist system itself. They all share a faith in a reformed, managed capitalism that  — shorn of its deviations — will somehow serve all classes.

After 33 years, this experiment in rescuing capitalism from itself should be discarded. It is time for the left to draw “a real and very useful lesson, a lesson in historical dialectics, a lesson in an understanding of the political struggle, and in the art and science of waging that struggle,” in Lenin’s words.

If defeating capitalism is our goal, it requires tried and tested forms of political organisation: a revolutionary political organisation. It requires a bold, independent party embodying both democracy and centrism, a Leninist party with a clear programme based on enlisting working people to the greatest project of the 21st century: winning and constructing socialism. That is what history teaches.

Zoltan Zigedy is a US-based writer who blogs at zzs-blg.blogspot.com.